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Background and aims: Recent studies have challenged the anxiety-avoidance model of obsessive–compulsive
disorder (OCD), linking OCD to impulsivity, risky-decision-making and reward-system dysfunction, which can also
be found in addiction and might support the conceptualization of OCD as a behavioral addiction. Here, we conducted
an exploratory investigation of the behavioral addiction model of OCD by assessing whether OCD patients are more
impulsive, have impaired decision-making, and biased probabilistic reasoning, three core dimensions of addiction, in
a sample of OCD patients and healthy controls.Methods:We assessed these dimensions on 38 OCD patients and 39
healthy controls with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11), the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Beads Task.
Results: OCD patients had signiﬁcantly higher BIS-11 scores than controls, in particular on the cognitive subscales.
They performed signiﬁcantly worse than controls on the IGT preferring immediate reward despite negative future
consequences, and did not learn from losses. Finally, OCD patients demonstrated biased probabilistic reasoning as
reﬂected by signiﬁcantly fewer draws to decision than controls on the Beads Task. Conclusions: OCD patients are
more impulsive than controls and demonstrate risky decision-making and biased probabilistic reasoning. These
results might suggest that other conceptualizations of OCD, such as the behavioral addiction model, may be more
suitable than the anxiety-avoidance one. However, further studies directly comparing OCD and behavioral addiction
patients are needed in order to scrutinize this model.
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INTRODUCTION
The stereotypical portrait of an obsessive–compulsive
patient is an excessively self-controlled, risk aversive indi-
vidual that acts in order to avoid potential loss or punish-
ments. Although this portrait ﬁts well with several clinical
studies showing increased harm-avoidance in obsessive–
compulsive disorder (OCD) (Kim, Kang & Kim, 2009),
more recent clinical, neuropsychological and neuroimaging
studies challenged this idea and described a different portrait
of OCD.
First of all, several clinical studies suggest that impul-
sivity may be a feature of OCD (Benatti, Dell’Osso, Arici,
Hollander & Altamura, 2013; Ettelt et al., 2007). Moreover,
a recent study demonstrated excessive self-control (the
capacity to delay rewards) only in obsessive–compulsive
personality disorder (OCPD) patients, but not in OCD
patients (Pinto, Steinglass, Greene, Weber & Simpson,
2013). In addition, several neurocognitive studies report
risky decision-making (preference for an immediate reward
despite negative future consequences) in both adults and
children with OCD (Cavedini, Gorni & Bellodi, 2006;
Cavedini, Riboldi, D’Annucci & Bellodi, 2002; Cavedini,
Riboldi, Keller, D’Annucci & Bellodi 2002; Cavedini et al.,
2012; Cavedini, Zorci, Piccini, Cavallini & Bellodi 2010; da
Rocha, Alvarenga, Malloy-Diniz & Correa 2011; da Rocha,
Malloy-Diniz, Lage & Correa 2011; da Rocha et al. 2008;
Kodaira et al., 2012; Kashyap, Kumar, Kandavel & Reddy,
2013; Starcke, Tuschen-Cafﬁer, Markowitsch & Brand,
2010). Also, studies on probabilistic reasoning failed to
ﬁnd that OCD patients had less conﬁdence in their choices,
or needed more information before reaching a decision
compared to controls (Fear & Healy, 1997; Pelissier
and O’Connor, 2002; Reese, McNally & Wilhelm, 2011;
Jacobsen, Freeman & Salkovskis, 2012). Finally, recent
neuroimaging studies showed reward dysfunction in OCD
(Figee et al., 2011; Admon et al., 2012), similar to ﬁndings
in disorders that are characterized by reduced impulse
control and risk-seeking behaviours such as pathological
gambling and substance dependence (Feil et al., 2010;
Miedl, Peters & Büchel, 2012). Extra evidences come from
D2 dopamine receptor binding studies that show a pattern of
binding reduction in OCD patients similar to that found by
other studies in addicted patients (Blum et al., 2014; Denys
et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2009).
Increased impulsivity, risky decision-making and reward-
system dysfunction in these studies conﬂict with the stereo-
typical OCD portrait of doubtfulness and risk-aversiveness.
In fact, these ﬁndings are prototypical for addiction and
have led some authors in the last years to view OCD as a
behavioural addiction (Denys, Zohar & Westemberg, 2004;
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Figee et al., 2011; Grant, Brewer & Potenza, 2006; Holden,
2001). In this perspective, comparable to addiction, OCD is
perceived as process, in which patients with OCD develop
over time a dependency upon their compulsive behaviours
because of the rewarding effect when performed perfectly or
when compulsions reduce obsession-induced anxiety or
distress (Denys, 2011). However, this model has never been
tested thoroughly in OCD and it is therefore still a theoretical
paradigm.
Impulsivity and risky decision-making have been linked
to the development of substance and behavioural addictions
(Grant & Chamberlain, 2014; Balogh, Mayes & Potenza,
2013). Moreover, biased probabilistic reasoning has been
observed in substance use disorder, pathological gamblers,
Parkinson’s patients with medication-induced behavioural
addictions and recently also in subjects with elevated risk
for the development of alcohol addiction (Morris et al.,
2015; Voon et al. 2015). Thus, these cognitive facets could
be also relevant for the development of a dependency upon
compulsions. The studies mentioned above assessed impul-
sivity (Trough the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale), decision-
making (Trough the Iowa Gambling Task) and probabilistic
reasoning (Trough the Beads Task) separately (Benatti
et al., 2013; Cavedini et al., 2010; Jacobsen et al., 2012);
no study examined all these domains at once in one OCD
sample. Moreover, they included only small patient samples
and they did not exclude patients with episodic OCD or with
comorbid Axis I or II disorders (Jacobsen et al., 2012; Reese
et al., 2011). Thus, the aim of the present study was to
investigate the role of impulsivity, decision-making and
probabilistic reasoning, as core dimensions of addiction, in
a single sample of patients with a primary diagnosis of
OCD. According to a behavioral addiction model of OCD,
our hypothesis is that OCD patients show increased impul-
sivity, risky decision-making and biased probabilistic
reasoning compared to healthy controls.
METHODS
Participants
We recruited 40 outpatients with OCD from the OCD unit of
the University of Florence. We included only patients with a
primary diagnosis of OCD, without comorbid mental dis-
orders (except for chronic tic disorders) and with good
insight into their disorder. The latter inclusion criterion was
selected in order to avoid a putative effect of delusional
beliefs on the probabilistic reasoning task. Inclusion criteria
were established based on: 1) presence of DSM-IV criteria
for OCD, established by a psychiatrist and conﬁrmed by the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis-I
Disorders/Patient Edition (SCID-I/P) (First, Spitzer, Gibbon
& Williams, 2002a); 2) good insight, established by a
psychiatrist and rated with the Yale-Brown Obsessive–
Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS) (score of 0 or 1 on the insight
item) (Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, Mazure, Delgado et al.,
1989; Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, Mazure, Fleischman
et al., 1989); 3) age between 18 and 65 years. We excluded
potential patients with any of the following conditions: 1)
current DSM-IV Axis I diagnosis other than OCD and/or
lifetime DSM-IV diagnosis of bipolar I or II disorder,
schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders, substance abuse/
dependence, Tourette’s disorder; 2) any Axis II clinical
diagnosis (established by a clinical interview conducted in
accordance to the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II) ﬂow-chart) (First,
Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams & Benjamin, 1997); 3) episodic
OCD; 4) illness duration less than two years; 5) hospitali-
zation in the last 6 months; 6) pharmacological treatment
changes in the last 3 months; 7) mental disorder due to a
general medical condition or history of mental retardation.
We enrolled 40 healthy controls matched for gender,
age and educational attainment, recruited by advertisements
and word of mouth, with an age between 18 and 65 years,
without a history of OCD or any other mental disorder, as
conﬁrmed by the SCID-I/NP (Non-patient Edition) (First,
Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 2002b). Demographic vari-
ables of all subjects are displayed in Table 1. All study
procedures occurred in 1 day.
Procedures and assessments
Clinical assessments. OCD symptoms and severity were
assessed by independent evaluators using the Y-BOCS
(range 0–40 with higher scores representing greater severity)
and the Y-BOCS symptom checklist (Y-BOCS-SC)
(Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, Mazure, Delgado et al.,
1989; Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, Mazure, Fleischman et
al., 1989). On the basis of the Y-BOCS-SC patients’ primary
symptoms were classiﬁed as one of ﬁve a priori dimensions:
1) doubt/checking; 2) contamination/cleaning; 3) symmetry/
ordering; 4) unacceptable/taboo thoughts; 5) hoarding. The
sub-classiﬁcation on these a priori ﬁve dimensions was
Table 1. Sociodemographic variables and Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) mean scores and standard deviation (sd)
for OCD patients and healthy controls
OCD Controls p
Sex 39.47% F, 60,53% M 51.28% F, 48.72% M 0.298
Age 36.29 (sd 12.73) 34.10 (sd 11.18) 0.469
Years of education 14.63 (sd 2.69) 15.64 (sd 2.92) 0.085
BIS-11
Attentional Impulsiveness 16.92 (sd 4.55) 14.33 (sd 3.31) 0.005
Motor Impulsiveness 21.10 (sd 4.93) 20.56 (sd 3.91) 0.751
Nonplanning Impulsiveness 27.18 (sd 5.11) 24.92 (sd 4.11) 0.035
BIS-11 Total Score 65.21 (sd 12.49) 59.82 (sd 8.34) 0.026
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based on factor analysis performed on previous studies
(Brakoulias et al., 2013). We also performed a clinical
interview in order to assess social and demographic vari-
ables, duration of illness, current or past history of tics (two
patients had a history of chronic tic disorder and ﬁve patients
a past history of transient tic disorder), current pharmaco-
logical treatments (32 out of 38 patients were using serotonin
reuptake inhibitors and/or atypical antipsychotics) and his-
tory of treatment resistance (deﬁned as non-response
(< 25% improvement in baseline Y-BOCS scores) to at least
one adequate serotonin re-uptake inhibitor (SRI) trial
(maximum recommended dose for at least 12 weeks) and
non-response to a 16 sessions cognitive behavioral trial)
(Pallanti et al., 2002). Clinical variables of OCD subjects are
displayed in Table 2.
Impulsivity. Impulsivity traits were assessed using the
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, version 11 (BIS-11). This scale
consists of 30 self-descriptive items, with responses in a
four-point Likert-type scale ranging from “Rarely/Never” to
“Almost Always/Always.” (Patton, Stanford & Barratt,
1995). It measures the total score (range: 30–120) of
impulsivity and three factors: Attentional Impulsiveness
(AI), Motor Impulsiveness (MI), and Non-planning Impul-
siveness (NPI) with higher scores indicating higher impul-
sivity. BIS-11 was used in its Italian translation (Fossati, Di
Ceglie, Acquarini & Barratt, 2001).
Decision-making. To assess decision-making we used
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a card game that is widely
used to study decision-making under risk (the probability of
different outcomes are known) and ambiguity conditions
(the probability of different outcomes are unknown) (Brand,
Labudda & Markowitsch, 2007; Brand, Recknor, Graben-
horst & Bechara, 2007). Decision making behaviors on the
IGT can separate “risky-players” that prefer immediate
reward despite negative future consequences, from “risky-
avoidant” players that prefer small but long-term rewarding
choices (Cavedini et al., 2012). In the IGT the subject must
make 100 card selections from four decks (A, B, C, and D)
and the objective is the maximum proﬁt. At the beginning of
the test the subjects receive a loan of play-money. After
turning over each card, subjects are either given money or
asked to pay a penalty according to a programmed schedule
of reward and punishment. Gains and losses are different for
each deck. Decks A and B (disadvantageous decks) are high
paying but disadvantageous in the long run, because the
penalties are even higher. Decks C and D (advantageous
decks), on the other hand, are low paying but advantageous
because the penalties are lower, resulting in an overall gain
in the long run. In this study we used a computerized version
of the original IGT (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Ander-
son, 1994; Cois, 2007; Struglia et al., 2011; Tommasini
et al., 2012). The performance was measured using the net
score, deﬁned by choices from advantageous (C and D)
minus disadvantageous (A and B) decks, with higher scores
indicating a risk-avoidant pattern of decision making. The
net score for each block of 20 cards was also considered in
order to evaluate the choice behavior during the task. We
considered the 1st and 2nd blocks as decisions under
ambiguity, due to the fact that the probability of outcome
is unknown during these blocks of choices. On the other
hand we considered the 3rd, 4th and 5th blocks as decisions
under risk, due to the fact that subjects learn how the decks
work during the ﬁrst and second block and thus the proba-
bility of outcome is known during these blocks of choices
(Brand, Labudda et al., 2007; Brand, Recknor et al., 2007).
Probabilistic reasoning. To assess biases in probabilistic
reasoning, participants completed the beads task, an experi-
mental task designed to examine individuals’ reasoning
style under conditions of uncertainty (Phillips & Edwards,
1966). Decision making behaviors on the beads task can
separate normal subjects from “rash-decision makers” that
are conﬁdent in their decisions, despite not having enough
information. This task has a standard paradigm in which
participants are required to judge from which jar (out of two)
different colored beads are being drawn. One jar might
contain 85 beads of one color (green) and 15 beads of
another color (purple). The second jar contains the same
number of beads, but with the reverse distribution (15 green
and 85 purple). Participants – knowing a priori the distri-
bution of beads in the jars – are shown a series of beads that
are drawn one at a time from one of the two jars, with each
bead being replaced in its original jar after the participant
has seen it. Participants are required to indicate when they
are conﬁdent enough to make a judgment on which jar the
beads are being drawn from. A maximum of 20 beads were
presented to each participant in each trial. If participants did
not make a decision after 20 beads, the computer prompted
them to do so. We implemented a computerized version of
the beads task (Stratta et al., 2013) on the basis of literature
evidence recommendations (Huq, Garety & Hemsley,
Table 2. OCD patients’ clinical data
Clinical data
YBOCS Total Score 21.79 (sd 6.48)
Illness duration (years) 18.24 (sd 12.76)
History of tic disorder (number of patients) 7/38 (18.42%)
Patients taking medications (SRIs or SRIs+ antipsychotics) 32/38 (84.21%)
Patients taking SRIs or SSRI+antipsychotics 5/38 (13.6%)–27/38 (71.05%)
History of treatment resistance (number of patients) 27/38 (71.05%)
Symptoms dimensions (number of patients per symptom dimension) doubt/checking: 16/38 (42.1%)
contamination/cleaning: 8/38 (21.05%)
symmetry/ordering: 6/38 (15.79%)
unacceptable/taboo thoughts: 7/38 (18.42%)
hoarding: 1/38 (2.63%)
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1988). The performance was measured, recording the num-
ber of beads requested before reaching a decision (“draws to
decision”), as a measure of the amount of information
needed to make a decision. According to previous studies
we considered 1 or 2 draws to decision as the threshold for a
biased probabilistic reasoning (Ormrod et al., 2012). In order
to minimize the effects of a miscomprehension of both tasks
(IGT and Beads Task), each trial was preceded by a pre-
explanation of the task after which the participants had to
prove their understanding of the tasks.
Statistical analyses
Normality of variables was evaluated using Shapiro-Francia
W’ test. Normally distributed variables in OCD and control
group were: years of education, IGT Net Score1, IGT Net
Score2, Net Score3, Net Score4, Net Score5, IGT ﬁnal Net
Score, BIS-11 Attentional factor, BIS-11 Non-planning fac-
tor subscores. Age and Number of draws in Beads task were
non-normally distributed in both groups, BIS-11 Motor
factor subscore was non-normally distributed in control
group while BIS-11 Scale score and duration of illness were
non-normally distributed in OCD group. In order to compare
the two groups on socio-demographic and clinical variables,
a χ2 test was used for gender and for proportion of subjects
that made only 1 or 2 draws to decision in Beads task; t-test
was used to compare continuous or interval normally dis-
tributed variables. Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test was used
to compare continuous or interval non-normally distributed
variables. Repeated measures ANOVA was used to assess
IGT performance over time.
Pearson’s correlation test was used to test the interaction
between clinical variables (natural logarithm of duration of
illness, presence of pharmacological treatment and history
of treatment resistance, Y-BOCS score, symptom dimen-
sions, history of tics) and natural logarithm of BIS-11 total
score, IGT ﬁnal Net Score, natural logarithm of Beads task
draws to decision in the clinical group; we used natural
logarithm due to non-normality of the variables ‘BIS-11
total score’ and ‘Beads task draws to decision’.
Statistical tests were two-tailed. Level of signiﬁcance
was set at p = 0.05. Considering that we tested multiple
hypotheses using the same variables with Pearson’s corre-
lation test, Hochberg’s correction was applied. We used
Hochberg’s adjustment because it is less conservative and
has more power than Bonferroni’s (Blakesley et al., 2009).
All analyses were carried out using STATA statistical
software V.12.1 (StataCorp, Texas).
Ethics
The study procedures were carried out in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki. The study was approved by the
Institutional Review Board of the University of Florence
and all participants had to sign the informed consent to be
included in the study.
RESULTS
The ﬁnal sample was composed of 38 OCD patients (2 of the
40 recruited patients did not complete the assessment, 1 due
to onset of headache during the assessment and 1 because he
decided to quit the experiment after signing informed con-
sent) and 39 healthy controls (1 of the 40 recruited healthy
controls decided not to complete the assessment).
Impulsivity
Compared to healthy controls, patients had signiﬁcantly
higher total BIS-11 scores (p = 0.0258) and Non-planning
(p = 0.0354) and Attentional (p = 0.0055) BIS-11 subscores
(see Table 1).
Decision-making
Patients’ performance on IGT (IGT ﬁnal Net Score) was
signiﬁcantly worse than controls (–5 (sd 40.45) vs 11.03
(sd 27.71); p = 0.046) (see Table 3), indicating a preference













block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
Iowa Gambling Task Net Score per block
Controls
OCD Patients
Figure 1. Net score’s mean and standard error for each block for OCD patients and healthy controls
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OCD patients compared to healthy individuals. We did not
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between patients and controls in
the single blocks of choices or in performance under
ambiguity (considering jointly the performance on the 1st
and 2nd block of choices) or under risk (considering jointly
performance on the 3rd, 4th and 5th block of choices),
indicating that patients’ performance was not inﬂuenced by
the knowledge of outcomes’ probability. We also compared
IGT performance over time in each group in order to
analyze decision pattern changes over the task: controls’
performance signiﬁcantly improved from the 1st block of
choices to the last block (F4, 152 = 3.00, p = 0.021, η2par-
tial = 0.073), while patients’ performance did not improve
(F4, 148 = 0.84, p = 0.501, η2partial = 0.022), indicating a
lack of learning from negative outcomes (see Figure 1).
Probabilistic reasoning
Patients made signiﬁcantly fewer draws to decision than
healthy controls on the Beads Task (3.76 (sd 4.54) vs 7.79
(sd 5.90); p = 0.0002) and the proportion of subjects that
made only 1 or 2 draws to decision (considered as the
threshold for a biased probabilistic reasoning by previous
studies) (Ormrod et al., 2012) was signiﬁcantly higher in the
OCD group (22/38: 57.89% vs 8/39: 20.51%; p = 0.001)
(see Table 3 and Figure 2), indicating an overconﬁdence in
decisions in patients.
Correlation analysis
Pearson product-moment correlation coefﬁcients between
clinical variables (symptom severity, illness duration, pres-
ence or history of tics, presence of medications, history of
treatment resistance, symptom dimensions), natural loga-
rithm of BIS-11 total score, IGT ﬁnal Net Score and natural
logarithm of Beads task draws to decision were not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.
DISCUSSION
In this study we conducted an exploratory investigation of
the behavioral addiction model of OCD, by assessing three
core dimensions of addiction in OCD patients. OCD
patients demonstrate increased impulsivity, risky deci-
sion-making and biased probabilistic reasoning compared
to healthy controls.
Table 3. IGT net score per block, IGT Final net score and Beads Task draws to decision, mean and standard deviation (sd) in OCD patients
and healthy controls. Percentage of subjects who drew 1 or 2 beads in OCD group and healthy controls group
OCD Controls p
IGT (Iowa Gambling Task)
IGT Net Score block 1 −1.84 (sd 6.68) −1.02 (sd 6.68) 0.593
IGT Net Score block 2 −2.39 (sd 9.29) 0.90 (sd 7.83) 0.097
IGT Net Score block 3 0.37 (sd 10.96) 3.23 (sd 9.64) 0.227
IGT Net Score block 4 −1.05 (sd 12.16) 3.13 (sd 9.74) 0.099
IGT Net Score block 5 0.08 (sd 13.09) 4.79 (sd 11.40) 0.085
IGT Final Net Score −5 (sd 40.45) 11.03 (sd 27.71) 0.046
Beads Task
Draws to decision 3.76 (sd 4.54) 7.79 (sd 5.90) 0.000
Number of subjects who made 1 or 2 draws to decision 22/38 (57.89%) 8/39 (20.51%) 0.001
Figure 2. On the left the mean beads draws (and standard errors) for OCD patients and healthy controls. On the right the percentage of
subjects who drew 1 or 2 beads in the OCD and the control group
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A higher degree of impulsivity on the BIS-11 in OCD is
consistent with other studies, showing that OCD patients are
more impulsive than healthy controls (Benatti et al., 2013;
Ettelt et al., 2007) and is in line with studies showing that
disinhibition, which is a core dimension of impulsive
behaviors, is central to OCD and may even represent a
separate endophenotype (Fineberg et al., 2010). We found
increased impulsivity score in particular in the BIS-11
Non-planning and Attentional domains, which is in line
with previous studies (Benatti et al., 2013; Ettelt et al.,
2007), conﬁrming the predominance of cognitive impulsiv-
ity in OCD.
Our second ﬁnding, risky decision making on the Iowa
Gambling Task in OCD patients compared to controls, is
consistent with other studies showing an impaired perfor-
mance on this task in patients with OCD relative to healthy
controls (Cavedini et al., 2006; Cavedini, Riboldi, D’An-
nucci et al., 2002; Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller et al., 2002;
Cavedini et al., 2012, Cavedini et al., 2010; da Rocha,
Alvarenga et al., 2011; da Rocha, Malloy-Diniz et al., 2011;
da Rocha et al. 2008; Kashyap et al., 2013; Kodaira et al.,
2012; Starcke et al., 2010). Our OCD sample showed a
preference for immediate rewards despite negative future
consequences and did not learn from losses. Healthy con-
trols at the beginning of the IGT usually are likely to choose
from the disadvantageous decks, due to their higher
rewards. However, they progressively switch to the advan-
tageous decks after having learnt that avoiding the higher
losses of disadvantageous decks results in obtaining greater
long-term gains. This pattern of behavior, in which losses
are more effective than rewards in orienting choices, has
been extensively described as loss aversion and loss avoid-
ance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, 1979). Accordingly,
we found loss avoidance also in our healthy controls.
However, OCD patients did not show any signiﬁcant im-
provement during the task, implying that their choices were
not oriented by loss avoidance. In contrary to some studies
that used a different decision-making task (Starcke et al.,
2010; Starcke, Tuschen-Cafﬁer, Markowitsch & Brand,
2009) we did not ﬁnd evidence for an impairment of
decision making in ambiguous conditions relative to risky
conditions. On the contrary, patients had greater impair-
ments under risky conditions, which is consistent with some
studies that used the IGT in OCD (Kodaira et al., 2012),
suggesting that decision-making in OCD may be not related
to the presence of an ambiguous situation. However, these
observations are limited by the fact that the dissociation of
decision-making process under ambiguity and risky condi-
tions through the IGT is still debated and recent studies
demonstrated different performances under risk in OCD,
using different decision-making tasks (Kim et al., 2015).
Our third ﬁnding of biased probabilistic reasoning in
OCD, e.g. fewer draws to decision on the Beads Task may
reﬂect overconﬁdence and reﬂection impulsivity (Voon
et al., 2015). Although this ﬁnding sounds paradoxical when
thinking of the doubtfulness of a patient with checking
symptoms, overconﬁdence and reﬂection impulsivity are
two cognitive facets consistent with our and other studies
that found increased cognitive impulsivity in OCD (Benatti
et al., 2013, Ettelt et al., 2007). Moreover, more than 70%
of patients included in the ﬁnal sample had a history of
treatment-resistance that has been linked to the presence of a
higher degree of impulsivity traits in OCD patients by
previous studies (Kashyap et al., 2012). Previous studies
did not ﬁnd different performance between OCD and healthy
controls using this task (Fear and Healy, 1997; Pelissier and
O’Connor, 2002; Reese et al., 2011). However, the present
work differs from these studies as we included only pure
OCD without co-morbidity (except for 2 patients with
chronic tic disorder) and without an episodic illness course,
since these characteristics may be related to disorders within
the bipolar spectrum (Mahasuar, Janardhan & Math, 2011).
In fact, OCD in bipolar-spectrum patients seems to occur
signiﬁcantly more often in the depressive phases of the
disorder and anxiety disorders comorbidities (panic, agora-
phobia, social anxiety and avoidant personality) are two
times more frequent than in non-bipolar OCD (Amerio
et al., 2014; Shashidhara, Sushma, Viswanath, Math &
Janardhan Reddy, 2015). Thus, we can hypothesize that
these facets of episodic-OCD could affect cognitive perfor-
mances in a different direction with respect to chronic OCD.
Our results seem to support the conceptualization of
OCD as a disorder of behavioral addiction. Indeed, many
studies showed that addicted patients have higher impulsiv-
ity scores on the BIS-11 (Kjome et al., 2010; Verdejo-
Garcia, Lawrence & Clark, 2008) and several studies
showed that substance-addicted and pathological gamblers
have the same pattern of risky decision making, i.e. a
preference for immediate reward, despite negative future
consequences on the IGT (Cavedini, Riboldi, D’Annucci
et al., 2002; Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller et al., 2002;
Lemenager et al., 2011; Tommasini et al., 2012) (but see
also Choi et al., 2014; Dannon, Schoenfeld, Rosenberg,
Kertzman, & Kotler, 2010). Furthermore, recent studies
showed that detoxiﬁed-alcoholic patients and stimulant-
dependent subjects showed a biased probabilistic reasoning
on the Beads Task, similar to our results in OCD patients
(Stratta et al., 2013; Voon et al., 2015).
Preference for immediate reward and impulsivity have
been linked to substance addiction by neuroeconomic stud-
ies because of their capacity to motivate the behavior toward
a substance (the immediate reward) despite its future nega-
tive consequences (Monterosso, Piray & Luo, 2012). Nev-
ertheless, also compulsions represent an immediate reward
(relieving anxiety) with future negative consequences (both
in terms of time consuming and distress). Thus, in a
behavioral addiction perspective, preference for immediate
reward, cognitive impulsivity and overconﬁdence could
also be relevant in the development of a dependency toward
compulsions.
Several limitations are worth mentioning. One potential
limitation is that we did not assess the Intelligence Quotients
(IQs) of patients and controls. However, a large majority of
the studies on IGT in both clinical and non-clinical samples
showed a non-signiﬁcant relationship between IQ and IGT
performance (Toplak, Sorge, Benoit, West & Stanovich,
2010). Moreover, IQ did not affect Beads task’s perfor-
mance in other clinical samples (Ormrod et al., 2012).
Finally, every participant of the study had to prove his
comprehension of the tasks before starting the experiment
and we excluded subjects with intellectual disability. Thus,
it is unlikely that differences in IQs affected our results.
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Another potential limitation is that we used a clinical
interview to exclude the presence of personality disorders
and not the SCID-II (First et al., 1997). Thus, we cannot rule
out the hypothetical presence of some sub-threshold Axis II
symptoms, mainly obsessive–compulsive personality traits,
and its putative effect on the decision-making tasks. More-
over, our study is lacking of a behavioral measure of
impulsivity that could detect more speciﬁcally than BIS-
11 the presence of impulsive traits.
Regarding our inclusion/exclusion criteria, the exclusion
of co-morbid psychiatric conditions may compromise the
generalizability of the ﬁndings to the whole population of
OCD patients. Thus, further studies including comorbid-
patients are needed.
Finally, 32 out of 38 patients were using serotonergic
and/or dopaminergic agents which might have inﬂuenced
their performances since these neurotransmitters have been
related to impulsivity and decision making (Cools, Robert &
Robbins, 2008; Simon et al., 2013). However, our results on
decision-making and impulsivity are consistent with previ-
ous studies on un-medicated OCD patients (Boisseau et al.,
2012; Cavedini et al., 2012) and our regression analysis
conﬁrmed that medications did inﬂuence neither neurocog-
nitive performances nor impulsivity scores.
Lastly, we can not directly clarify which component of
the economic choice process is impaired in OCD, because
we did not include in our methods a neurophysiological
measure, such as transdermal conductance, during the deci-
sion-making task. Of note, other OCD models can account
for our results on decision-making and probabilistic reason-
ing. Indeed, our results could be interpreted in terms of
deﬁcits of the inhibitory control system (mainly involving
the medial parts of the frontal cortex structures) and of the
executive functions (mainly involving the dorsal parts of the
frontal cortex structures), respectively, as proposed by some
authors (Friedlander & Desrocher, 2006).
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, OCD patients are more impulsive than
healthy controls and demonstrate risky decision-making
and biased probabilistic reasoning. These results might
corroborate the novel conceptualization of OCD as a be-
havioral addiction and highlight the need of further system-
atic studies directly comparing behavioral addicted patients
and OCD patients.
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